





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DIRECTORATE OF  
INTELLIGENCE

# *WEEKLY SUMMARY*

## *Special Report*

*Yugoslav-Romanian Relations: An "Alliance of Convenience"*

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### *Yugoslav-Romanian Relations: An "Alliance of Convenience"*

The driving force in Yugoslav-Romanian cooperation is their mutual fear about Moscow's hegemonistic tendencies. The views of Tito and Ceausescu, who are 79 and 53 years of age respectively, further coincide in their oft-expressed conviction that every Communist party and, indeed, every nation is equal and the master of its own house.

Committed to noninterference in the affairs of other parties, the two Balkan freethinkers have demonstrated the strength of their convictions by readiness to cooperate in resisting Moscow's will. Indeed, risk taking has become one of the prime characteristics of their actions. This risk taking ranges from a strong interest in the promotion of Balkan detente to a receptivity to Peking's initiatives—each of which strikes sensitive Soviet nerves.

Although Yugoslav-Romanian cooperation predates the invasion of Czechoslovakia, that event markedly increased their apprehensions and broadened their community of interests. Numerous consultations between Tito and Ceausescu as well as their representatives underscore this closer cooperation. And these meetings have led to agreement on most major issues confronting the international Communist movement.



This cooperation has evolved despite sharp differences on the internal scene, where Yugoslavia is liberal and Romania strikingly orthodox. Neither these differences nor Romania's membership in the Warsaw Pact, to which Yugoslavia does not belong, stands in the way of a continuing dialogue.

An important key to close Yugoslav-Romanian relations is Tito's health. In the period just after his death, the Yugoslavs naturally would concentrate on domestic affairs, both to achieve an orderly succession and to cope with expected Soviet interference. Whether such interference actually takes place, the pace and thrust of Yugoslav-Romanian cooperation probably would undergo only a temporary setback.

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## SELECTED ROMANIAN-YUGOSLAV POLITICAL EXCHANGES, 1966-71

Ceaurescu Consolidates Rule	26-30 January	1966	Romanian Premier Maurer leads high-level delegation to Belgrade, where he meets with President Tito.
	18-23 April	1966	President Tito pays an official state visit to Romania.
	1-3 December	1966	Tito and Ceausescu meet in Timosara to discuss their opposition to an upcoming meeting of European Communist parties at Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia.
	22-23 February	1967	Yugoslav Foreign Secretary Nikezic leads delegation to Bucharest at invitation of Romanian Foreign Minister Manescu. Visit takes place on eve of Karlovy Vary meeting.
	16 June	1967	Foreign Minister Manescu in Belgrade to discuss Middle East crisis; Belgrade and Bucharest took different views about "Israeli aggression."
The "Prague Spring"	3-4 January	1968	Ceausescu, Maurer, and ideologue Niculescu-Mizil talk with Tito in Belgrade following Dubcek's coming to power in Czechoslovakia.
	21-22 March	1968	Nikezic in Bucharest at Manescu's invitation following a "rump" meeting of the Warsaw Pact at Dresden.
	27 May - 1 June	1968	Ceausescu leads high-level Romanian delegation to Belgrade on a state visit.
The Era of the "Brezhnev Doctrine"	24 August	1968	Ceausescu and Tito meet at Vrsac in Yugoslavia in the wake of the invasion of Czechoslovakia.
	1-2 February	1969	Ceausescu and Tito meet at Timosara, Romania, where they pledge closer industrial, economic, and technical cooperation.
	26-28 June	1969	Niculescu-Mizil flies to Brioni, where he briefs Tito on events at the international conference of Communist parties in Moscow.
	16-19 August	1969	Foreign Minister Manescu visits Belgrade for talks with Yugoslav Foreign Secretary Tepavac.
	20 September	1969	Tito and Ceausescu hold consultations at Iron Gates ceremonies.
	12-15 January	1970	Romanian Premier Maurer leads another high-level delegation to Belgrade.
	16 July	1970	Tito receives Romanian politburo member Bodnaras.
	30 July	1970	Yugoslav Premier Ribicic holds talks with Maurer in Bucharest.
	3-4 November	1970	Ceausescu leads high-powered delegation to Belgrade for talks with Tito and other Yugoslav luminaries.
	11-13 May	1971	Yugoslav Foreign Minister Tepavac in Bucharest for talks with Manescu in advance of Ceausescu's China trip.
	10 August	1971	Manescu holds talks with Tepavac while "vacationing" in Yugoslavia. Talks take place as Soviets turn up the heat on the Balkan recalcitrants.

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*The Evolution of Romanian-Yugoslav Relations*

Postwar Romanian-Yugoslav relations lend proof in many ways to the political axiom that small states are limited in the ways they can act. These relations have developed slowly, despite the absence of major territorial disputes, which is a unique situation in the Balkans. Until the late 1950s, Yugoslavia's national Communism and Romania's sycophantic emulation of Moscow seriously impeded the normalization of relations between Belgrade and Bucharest. Although rarely among the more strident critics of Yugoslav revisionism, Bucharest nevertheless joined with other Communist countries during this period in attacking it.

The doctrinal keystone of Romanian and Yugoslav cooperation dates back to 1955-56, when Moscow and the world Communist movement endorsed the concept of separate roads to socialism. This concept called for noninterference in the affairs of individual parties and asserted that all parties were equal and therefore not subject to a general line, i.e., guidance from Moscow. Even before the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Romanians and Yugoslavs often had behaved as though they doubted Moscow's commitment to these principles. Since the invasion, neither Belgrade nor Bucharest has veiled their distrust of Soviet intentions, nor has either disguised its refusal to accept the "Brezhnev Doctrine," under which the Soviets retain a right to intervene to "assure the survival" of any socialist state.

Within Eastern Europe, the Romanian and Yugoslav regimes have an evident self-interest, both in promoting and in observing the principle of noninterference, because it is central to their continued national existence. The principle permits close alignment of foreign policy, even though their domestic policies are quite dissimilar. Romania is ideologically orthodox in sharp contrast to Yugoslavia's political liberalization and economic reforms.

In 1958, when Soviet troops were withdrawn from Romanian soil, the regime began to show considerable interest in developing state relations with Tito by promoting trade and other projects of mutual interest. Romania began to develop its own national Communist, more independent course, during the early 1960s, and the pace of party and state contacts quickened. Closer economic ties were highlighted in November 1962 by agreement to build the \$400 million Iron Gates hydroelectric and navigation installations on the Danube. Party-to-party relations were fully normalized in 1963.

By the time Ceausescu succeeded Gheorghiu-Dej in March 1965, developments within the international Communist movement provided him with the opportunity to expand the contacts that already had been set in motion by Dej and Tito. Foremost among these developments were the conflict between Moscow and Peking and the probability of Soviet probes of the new Romanian leadership to bring it into line.

Romanian-Yugoslav relations developed in two distinct periods after 1965. The first ran from March 1965 to June 1967, ending with the Arab-Israeli war. Tito sided with Nasir, his long-time ally in the nonaligned world. Ceausescu, responsive both to economic and technological benefits stemming from close ties to Israel as well as his commitment to the plight of small countries, broke ranks with Tito, indeed with his Warsaw Pact allies, by refusing to sign a pact declaration that condemned Israeli "aggression."

By the end of 1967, however, the two began to draw back together again. The Yugoslavs joined the Romanians in resisting the Soviet-sponsored meeting of Communist parties at Karlovy Vary, and the two saw similar problems and opportunities during the troubled last days of the Novotny regime in Czechoslovakia. Since January 1968 when Alexander Dubcek came to power in Czechoslovakia, statements by Tito and Ceausescu, as well as the sheer number of party and government exchanges, have demonstrated

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the value and emphasis that the two mavericks place on their close relationship.

Tito and Ceausescu are known to have met six times since January 1968; four of these meetings have taken place since the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August of that year. Eighteen other political exchanges at a high level have been held, including eight meetings of foreign ministers. Meetings between military figures, virtually unknown until January 1968, now total seven, thereby adding yet another and a potentially significant dimension.

When either Tito or Ceausescu is reacting to or on the verge of launching a foreign policy initiative, they normally consult. Thus, they met immediately after the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Their representatives also met last summer after Moscow applied psychological pressure against the recalcitrants for their receptivity to Chinese initiatives in the Balkans, and the Romanians talked to Yugoslav Foreign Minister Tepavac last May before Ceausescu and Tepavac visited China.

Given their experience following expulsion from the Cominform in 1948, the Yugoslavs can offer unique guidance on withstanding Soviet psychological pressure. There is reason to conclude that Belgrade has more than once counseled patience and moderation. Ceausescu apparently does not always accept such advice. The anti-Soviet tone of the Romanian-Chinese communiqué last June, for example, was thought to be unnecessarily harsh by the Yugoslavs.

The consultations, however, serve purposes other than those of guidance and the probability of policy coordination. From the personnel mix in these party and government exchanges, Tito appears to be using them as a way to acquaint Ceausescu with Yugoslavs who will take over in the post-Tito period. For his part, Ceausescu is willing to swallow his pride in order to transform the sessions into an advanced training ground for Romanians having responsibilities in the spheres of foreign affairs, interparty relations, economics, and military-security affairs.

### *An Alliance of Convenience*

Romanian-Yugoslav cooperation may or may not have reached its current state without the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and China's increased activity in Eastern Europe, particularly in the Balkans. It is certain, however, that nothing the Soviets could have consciously designed to drive Romania and Yugoslavia together could have succeeded better. What has since emerged is an alliance of convenience that includes increased interparty, military, and economic cooperation.

Alone among Eastern European leaders, except for Albania's Hoxha, Tito and Ceausescu have found common cause in the apprehension that they may be future Soviet targets. Accordingly, Belgrade and especially Bucharest set out to cement ties not only with each other but also with Western Europe, the US, their Balkan neighbors, and ultimately China. Conversely, their relations with the USSR, long ridden with anxiety and friction, have yet to recover, although they have shown improvement from the war of nerves this summer.

In order to dramatize their fears as well as to take a swipe at a wide range of opponents, Yugoslav opinion makers have cried out against "cominformism." Nothing stirs Yugoslav patriotism so much as references to the dark days of Tito's break with Stalin, but the "cominformism" Yugoslavs talk about today is far different from that of 1948. It is now a label under which a multitude of sins are attacked. "Cominformism," for example, means activity of which the regime disapproves because it might be exploited by the Soviets or some other adversary. Indeed, the Yugoslavs in part viewed Brezhnev's visit to Belgrade in late September as an opportunity to gain assurances against Soviet interference in Yugoslav affairs.

Underlying charges of "cominformism," Yugoslav misgivings over Moscow's intentions, and closer Yugoslav-Romanian relations is Belgrade's basic recognition that the time left for Tito to act as a unifying and stabilizing political

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force is limited. The Yugoslavs worry about Moscow's capabilities and willingness to use the post-Tito period to Soviet advantage. This, coupled with their own uncertainty over the outcome of the succession issue, sharpens Belgrade's response to signs of Soviet and Eastern European interest in its affairs.

Romanian references to foreign interference, on the other hand, have not stressed "cominformism." Ceausescu instead has only hinted at it in recent months by repeatedly emphasizing that "one cannot speak about the existence of a center or about the necessity of such a center existing." On three separate occasions in early September, *Scinteia*, the Romanian party daily, supplemented Ceausescu's remarks by writing that it is the "duty of each party not to encourage the existence of factions and factional fights in other parties."

Although presented in hypothetical terms, these allegations concerning a "center" and "factions" suggest that Bucharest (and Belgrade as well) is ultrasensitive to the specter of renewal of bloc pressure for conformity. Nevertheless, we have no good evidence that Moscow is tampering with either party, though it would be surprising if the Soviets have not been trying.

The Yugoslavs and Romanians appear particularly aware of the probability of Soviet interference and almost certainly have planned for every contingency to head off any increased Soviet influence in a Yugoslavia bereft of Tito. In many respects, Yugoslavia's new "collective presidency"—established to deal with the succession problem in an orderly manner—also is a mechanism designed to minimize the prospects of Soviet success.

#### *Military-Security Cooperation*

Virtually nonexistent prior to 1968, military cooperation has taken the form of an exchange of visits between the two countries' defense ministers as well as by the commanders in chief of the

border guards. Moreover, the frequency of contacts at the deputy foreign minister level conforms to practices identified with an exchange of intelligence.

Still, the Romanian-Yugoslav relationship on military questions remains clouded. On the basis of fragmentary evidence, the two appear to have a similar defense strategy providing for total mobilization of the population and partisan warfare. There may also be an agreement on small-arms manufacture as well as future joint production of other types of light weapons. One possible indication of the latter was Romanian Defense Minister Ionita's trip to Belgrade in July. The Yugoslav news agency stated that he used the occasion to become "informed about Yugoslav achievements in the sphere of military economy." Romanian-Yugoslav collaboration in the military supply field would mesh with Bucharest's expressed desire for reduced dependence on Moscow as a supply source.

There is no evidence that a mutual defense agreement has been concluded, nor is one likely in the foreseeable future. Romanian-Yugoslav interest in resisting the demands of the USSR would probably stop short of fighting each other's battles. The Yugoslavs and Romanians often can be gutsy antagonists of Moscow, but they are, first and foremost, political realists. The only circumstance under which the two could be expected to fight side-by-side would be if both were attacked simultaneously by the same aggressor. In the event that only one were attacked, the other no doubt would raise a clamor in the United Nations and elsewhere. Going to war, however, would not only invite disaster but also would contradict the value each places on the preservation of its national interests and achievements.

#### *Economic Relations*

Total trade turnover between Romania and Yugoslavia has increased from US \$15 million in 1960 to US \$65.4 million in 1970, and this amounts to more than a four-fold increase since

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1960. The prospects for 1971-75 are even brighter. An examination of available data on the composition of trade, however, does not indicate any unusual economic support for Romania by the Yugoslavs.

Although Romania has accumulated a \$16 million surplus since 1960, Yugoslavia's invisible earnings in tourism and transportation and credits connected with the Iron Gates hydroelectric project should have been sufficient to balance the account. In 1966-70, turnover equaled \$242 million—up 270 percent over the previous five years, and future plans call for a continuation of this trend. By 1975, turnover is to more than double, reaching a level of \$550 million. Besides increasing trade, Yugoslavia and Romania plan continued cooperation over a wide range of mutually advantageous economic areas.


The prime example of economic cooperation is, of course, the huge Iron Gates hydroelectric and navigation project on the Danube. Four of its power plants already are in operation. Another, much smaller, project is situated a few kilometers downriver from the Iron Gates. It is under construction following negotiations at the subministerial level. For a variety of reasons, including costs and convenience, the Romanians, like the Chinese, also have expanded their use of Yugoslav ports, such as Rijeka on the Adriatic, as an alternative to shipments through the Romanian port of Constanta.

Other areas of cooperation include production and delivery of electric locomotives. Yugoslavia also imports oil from the Middle East via 80 kilometers of Romanian pipeline to the Danube River port of Cernavoda, from where it is carried

### Yugoslavia's Trade with Romania, 1960-1970

(Yugoslav Statistical Yearbook)

35 Million US dollars



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by tanker upriver to a refinery at Pancevo near Belgrade. Other examples include Yugoslav long-term deliveries of bauxite and general cooperation in machine building, chemicals, raw materials deliveries, and certain border agreements. The most recent border agreement, signed last June, expanded the frontier area for noncommercial vehicular traffic. A new frontier point for such traffic also was scheduled to open on 2 October at Nadas (Romania) - Kaludjerovo (Yugoslavia). Cooperation in the areas of shipbuilding, the manufacture of farm machinery, electronics output, production of seeds and other agricultural items, railways, and in telecommunications is planned.

*Cooperation in Foreign Affairs*

While the invasion of Czechoslovakia was the catalyst for improved Yugoslav-Romanian relations, political ties between Belgrade and Bucharest grew even closer after June 1969, when Moscow hosted the International Conference of Communist parties. Yugoslavia boycotted the implicitly anti-Chinese conference, but the Romanians attended, defended the absent Chinese, and signed the main conference documents with reservations. Since then, the Soviets have applied pressure on Bucharest from time to time largely because of the latter's defense of Peking. Meanwhile, the Kremlin also has increased pressure on Yugoslavia—directly or indirectly, for example, through Bulgaria over Macedonia.

Important aspects of Yugoslav foreign policy have this year closely complemented Romanian diplomatic maneuvering. Thus, Ceausescu's visit to China last June culminated some intricate diplomatic footwork that involved not only closer ties with China, but also with the US and Yugoslavia. Meanwhile, Yugoslavia also improved its relations with China and the US, underscored by the visit to Peking of Foreign Minister Tepavac and Tito's visit to Washington next week. There has also been a cautious rapprochement between Belgrade and Tirana.

Improved Yugoslav-Romanian relations with China and the US, as well as their joint interest in forging closer ties with all Balkan nations, have adversely affected relations with the USSR. China is a major factor in Soviet foreign policy and strategic calculations, and anything that frustrates Moscow's objectives vis-a-vis Peking—such as refusal by Belgrade and Bucharest to participate in a united front against it—can only be viewed most seriously in the Kremlin. Similarly, even a remote prospect of an emerging Balkan entente would be even more alarming to Moscow if accompanied by Chinese involvement.

The campaign that the Soviets waged this past summer against China's alleged "splitting activities" in the socialist camp—particularly the Balkans—showed this alarm. An important facet of that campaign was the allegation that a Peking-Balkan "anti-Soviet axis" was in the making.

China clearly is interested in courting those Balkan nations that oppose Soviet hegemony in the region. It is equally clear, however, that Belgrade and Bucharest are willing to use improved ties with China as a counterweight to Moscow's dominance in the Balkans. Clear also is the conclusion that neither of them is prepared to exchange their experience with the hegemony of one great power for that of another, though the danger is less since China is neither so close nor so strong as the Soviet Union.

Soviet bloc media, led by Poland and Hungary at Moscow's behest, nevertheless tried to portray Yugoslavia as an accomplice of Romania in the alleged Chinese penetration of the Balkans. In so doing, however, these articles and, indeed, the Crimean summit on 2 August of "vacationing" East European leaders, save Ceausescu, evoked a vigorous defense of Romania by the Yugoslavs.

Given their location and ties to the Warsaw Pact, the Romanians could not easily defend themselves with such vigor. The Yugoslavs,

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however, had no such restrictions. They promptly seconded Ceausescu's initiatives for Balkan cooperation, and *Borba*, the party daily, endorsed Bucharest's reaffirmation of its old proposals for transforming the Balkans into a "zone without nuclear weapons and foreign bases." *Borba* then added that what was involved in the Romanian proposal was more than a position of principle, especially in the light of "multiparty military maneuvers" by the pact. Furthermore, *Borba*

characterized pact statements about an "anti-Soviet axis" in the Balkans as unfounded, incorrect, provocative, and as "impermissible warnings."

Significantly, the Romanians reaffirmed their proposals at the Geneva Disarmament Conference on 3 August, the day after the Crimean summit. Equally significant in terms of relations with Belgrade was Yugoslavia's decision to embrace the concept of multilateral cooperation in

### ROMANIAN-YUGOSLAV MILITARY EXCHANGES, 1965-71

27 October - 5 November 1965	Romanian Defense Minister Salajan visits Yugoslavia.
30 September - 7 October 1966	Yugoslavia Defense Minister Gosnjak on official visit to Romania.
28 January 1968	Romanian delegation, led by Col. Gen. Popescu, attends Kotor revolt ceremonies in Yugoslavia.
25 March 1968	Romanian Deputy Defense Minister Ion Gheorghe leads military delegation to Yugoslavia.
2-7 June 1969	Gheorghe again leads Romanian military delegation to Belgrade on the eve of the international conference of Communist parties in Moscow.
20-26 June 1969	Yugoslav Border Guard delegation, led by Col. Gen. Sacekic, visits Romania.
29 June 1970	Romanian General Petrut leads frontier guards delegation to Belgrade, where the Yugoslav defense secretary receives them.
25-26 December 1970	Yugoslav Defense Secretary Ljubicic in Bucharest for a "friendly working visit."
8-10 July 1971	Romanian Defense Minister Ionita leads military delegation to Belgrade for talks about the "Yugoslav military economy."

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the Balkans. Belgrade initially had been wary of this because of its dispute with Bulgaria over the Macedonian question. Once again, however, the heavy hand of a Soviet-inspired campaign of nerves drove Belgrade and Bucharest closer together.



Tito on his 78th birthday, 25 May 1970. The Romanians admire many aspects of his ruling style. Their outlook toward a Yugoslavia without Tito appears accurately characterized by the Romanian proverb, "A change of rulers is the joy of fools."

### *The Soviet Dilemma*

The Romanian-Yugoslav alliance poses both an embarrassing and difficult situation for the USSR. Their cooperation serves as an example for others in Eastern Europe, though neither Belgrade nor Bucharest has openly suggested as much. Indeed, their close ties are remarkable because Romania is a member of the Soviet system of institutional control—the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA). Yugoslavia maintains only observer status in CEMA and has never belonged to the pact.

Romanian membership in the pact and CEMA initially involved bowing to the political realities of 1955. Bucharest still accepts the necessity of membership in the pact and CEMA. In recent years, however, it has acted on the premise that one of its major resources in shaping the evolution and definition of intrabloc relations is its presence within bloc councils, which the Soviets increasingly strive to use as policy-coordinating agencies.

Despite Romanian obstructionist tactics within CEMA and the pact, the Soviets have not severely pressed the Romanians and the Yugoslavs. It is by no means certain, however, that Moscow will continue to be patient indefinitely if the recalcitrants go on flouting doctrine and solidarity by emphasizing their national interests. Furthermore, Belgrade and Bucharest recognize that any time the USSR wants to impose its discipline badly enough, it can and will.

Moscow has a range of sanctions—political, economic, and military—to apply. These can be used with greater effect against Romania than Yugoslavia. There is always an international price to pay, however. The Yugoslavs, and especially the Romanians, apparently calculate that the greater the world awareness of their predicament, the higher that price will be and the more potent world opinion will be as a deterrent to Soviet action. In addition, Moscow's fierce competition

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with China for influence in the Communist world compels it, from time to time, to seek good surface relations with Yugoslavia, as was most recently manifest in Brezhnev's visit to Belgrade.

Moreover, the mavericks appear to consider time itself an ally, because with time comes change, and changes have come to mean to Bucharest the possibility of an improved political atmosphere in Europe as well as changes in Soviet leadership and outlook. Meantime, Soviet reluctance to discipline the mavericks enables Bucharest and Belgrade to indulge in high-level international exchanges as well as to promote in public forums their principle of national Communism.

These tactics offer no absolute guarantee of safety, particularly to Romania, which has 830 miles of border with the USSR, but they may give the Kremlin pause before it undertakes radical action. Soviet military power is the obvious and ultimate sanction. There are, however, deterrents to a Soviet invasion. An invasion would compromise—more seriously than did the invasion of Czechoslovakia—Moscow's detente policy toward Western Europe. It would put a freeze on Soviet-US relations and it would go down very badly in the Third World, where the Yugoslavs and Chinese could be expected to exploit it as long as they could.

Moscow has available other less radical courses of action. Speeches by Tito and Ceausescu imply that the Soviets have already attempted to proselytize within the party leaderships of Yugoslavia and Romania. These efforts have failed, but this does not mean an end to attempts. Indeed, Moscow's best opportunity to sway the Yugoslav hierarchy will come after Tito's departure from the scene.

The Romanian party remains united behind Ceausescu, offering the Soviets little leverage inside the country. Long one of the most homogeneous and stable parties in Eastern Europe, this unity in part reflects measures taken by Ceausescu, especially since the invasion of Czech-



In his six years as Romanian party leader, 53-year-old Nicolae Ceausescu has generally been on the offensive in foreign policy. He knows when to pull in his horns, however, thereby practicing the peasant wisdom of another Romanian proverb, "Kiss the hand you cannot bite."

oslovakia, to ferret out potential Soviet sympathizers in key positions. It also reflects Ceausescu's style. He pensions off potential dissenters in honorific positions but takes care to keep them under surveillance.

Soviet-sponsored economic warfare against the Belgrade-Bucharest axis is another alternative. The Soviet Union is the largest trading partner of Romania and a major partner of Yugoslavia,

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despite the relative decline in such commerce. Accordingly, economic sanctions against the mavericks could hurt seriously, but they would hardly bring either one into line. Moscow's economic boycott of Yugoslavia in the late forties failed, as did also its sanctions against Albania and China when these countries had much more vulnerable economies than either Yugoslavia or Romania. Moreover, what US and other Western aid was to Yugoslavia and what Chinese assistance was to Albania later, Western aid could be—and much more effectively—to Yugoslavia and Romania in the future

### *The Outlook*

The thrust of future Yugoslav-Romanian cooperation will mainly depend on how long Tito lives. While he is alive, he and Ceausescu will continue to enhance their independence by exploiting all opportunities to enlarge their freedom of maneuver. Particularly for the Romanians, this will involve trying to keep Moscow off balance, hoping to pick up support on various issues in other Eastern European countries.

In practice, this means that Tito and Ceausescu will place paramount importance on serving their national interests by stressing economic modernization, attempting to play leading roles in the promotion of European detente, and continuing to follow their independent course. Domestically, each will carry out its national aims as part of its effort to promote internal unity and gain popularity.

Soviet policy toward the Belgrade-Bucharest axis also will be heavily conditioned by Tito's lifespan. For so long as he lives, and because Romania is the more vulnerable of the two, Moscow can be expected to adopt a differentiated approach in which the heaviest pressure to conform will be on Romania. With Yugoslavia, the Soviets will try persuasion tactics intended to

slow down its growing cooperation with Bucharest.

Indeed, Brezhnev's talks with Tito in late September and the Soviet leader's homeward-bound stops in Budapest and Sofia, while skipping Bucharest, suggest that he was interested in part in sowing doubt between Belgrade and Bucharest as well as in portraying Romania as isolated. Later, whatever its success in bringing the Romanians into line, Moscow could seize upon Tito's death as providing a new opportunity and opening for interfering in Yugoslav internal affairs. In that event, Soviet pressure could be applied against both Balkan recalcitrants. Belgrade and Bucharest, however, appear to count on the good relations that each has cultivated with others—especially the US and China—to provide some protection against Soviet designs.

Tito's death also can hardly help but affect Yugoslav-Romanian relations, if only temporarily. Instability in Yugoslavia during the succession period can be expected, despite Tito's decision to establish a collective presidency to minimize problems. The necessity of serving Belgrade's interests and making succession work thus could make it difficult for a new Yugoslav leadership to continue the inherited pace and thrust of relations with Romania.

Even after Tito's death, however, it seems likely that relations will continue to develop. Certainly, this would appear to be the case as long as Moscow has a strong interest in promoting European detente. Whatever their domestic policy differences may be, the paramount interest of both Yugoslavia and Romania will continue to center on advancing their national courses. In the event that Moscow should decide either to give up its quest for European detente or to pressure Romania or a Tito-less Yugoslavia back into line, the two probably will move closer together to assess Soviet intentions and coordinate policy.

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